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The Supreme Court
Tramples Gravel
By

LAWRENCE B. VELvEL*

From the standpoint of protecting political and civil freedoms, the cases decided by the Supreme Court during the last
few weeks of its 1971 term were a mixed bag at best. It is true
that some of the Court's rulings were favorable to those who
would protect political freedoms: the cases which struck down
governmental wiretapping without a warrant' and which protected the right of SDS to official recognition on campus 2 would
be two preeminent examples in this category. But it is equally
true that, with the four Nixon justices providing the hard core,
in a number of other cases the Court delivered some major blows
to important political freedoms. The more prominent cases of
this type come tripping quickly from the tongue. The Court
allowed shopping centers to stop people from peacefully handing
out handbills on vital subjects; 3 it did not permit citizens to
judicially attack the army's surveillance of dissenters and others;4
it held that the government can call newsmen before grand
juries;5 it ruled that the government can keep Marxist thinker
Ernest Mandel out of the country;( and-the focal point of this
article-it delivered some highly questionable rulings in the case
7
of Senator Mike Gravel.
As is well known, on June 29, 1971 Senator Gravel called a
night meeting of his Senate Subcommittee on Buildings and
Grounds. At the meeting he read from the Pentagon Papers and
then placed 47 volumes of the Papers in the public record.
*Professor of Law at the Catholic University; B.A., University of Michigan,

1960; J.D. University of Michigan Law School, 1963.
1Celbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972); United States v. United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
2 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
3
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
4 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
5
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Kl6eindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
7 Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).

KENm=CK

LAW JouNAL[

[VoL 61

Later on, he arranged for the Papers to be published by Beacon
Press.
As part of its war against those who revealed the Pentagon
Papers, the government wanted to have a grand jury investigate
Gravel's conduct. Gravel's position was that such an investigation was barred by the Constitution's speech and debate clause,

which says that "for any Speech or Debate in either House They
[Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned in any
other Place." 8 The Court said that neither Gravel nor the aide
who helped him could be questioned about his actions at the
subcommittee meeting of June 29. But five members of the
Court-the Nixon four plus White-ruled that questions could
be asked about possibly illegal sources of the classified Papers
and about the republication of the Papers. Justices Brennan,
Douglas and Marshall would not have permitted any such
questions to be asked, and Justice Stewart would not have
permitted questions to be asked about the source of the Papers.
The majority's rulings on sources and republication are undoubtedly helpful to Executive branch officials who may have
secrets which they wish to keep from Congress and the people.
But the rulings patently harm the ability of Congressmen, and
ultimately the people, to find out about the misdeeds of the
government. Also harmed is the ability of Congressmen to vote
with adequate information on government programs, and the
ability of citizens to vote with adequate information on their
leaders.
In his Congressional Government,9 no less a student of the
subject than Woodrow Wilson proclaimed the vital importance
of Congress' function in informing itself and the country about
what is going on in government. But Congress can inform neither
itself nor the people unless it has access to information. And to
get the information they need, legislators often must resort to
contacts with Executive branch officials who are willing to tell
Congressmen what is going on or to turn over necessary materials. I doubt that there is a competent office on Capitol Hill
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
9 W. WM.SON, CONGRESSIONAL GovmamNT: A STuDY IN AmmcAN PoLracs

(15th ed. 1885).
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which does not have these contacts. Without them, and without the ability to spread the information received from them,
legislators are often reduced to getting much of their information
from selfserving Executive handouts, which never seem to break
the bad news about Executive duplicity in war, military atrocities,
economic mistakes by the administration, racist policies in the
bureaucracy, and so on ad nauseam. Without Executive branch
contacts and the ability to spread the information received,
legislators will often be doomed to make their speeches and
cast their votes in partial or total ignorance of important facts
and ideas. And, as a corollary, constituents too will be casting
their ballots in ignorance.
But the willingness of persons in the Executive branch to
give information to legislators can only be lessened by the
majority's decision in Gravel. For now, when previously secret
information is made public by a legislator, the government can
convene a grand jury to question the legislator or his aides
about the source of the information. Even if it is very doubtful
that a crime was committed in obtaining and releasing the
information, as a basis for the grand jury questioning the government can pretend that it is seeking evidence of crimes that may
have occurred. As Justice Stewart said in his dissent:
Under the Court's ruling, a Congressman may be subpoenaed
by a vindictive Executive to testify about informants who
have not committed crimes and who have no knowledge of
crime. Such compulsion can occur, because the judiciary has
traditionally imposed virtually no limitations on the grand
jury's broad investigatory powers; grand jury investigations
are not limited to scope to specific criminal acts, and standards of materiality and relevance are greatly relaxed.1"
The government's ability to question legislators about the
source of their information will mean that officials who secretly
give information to Congress can be subjected to harassment,
loss of their jobs, and even prosecutions if there is any reason
to believe they may conceivably have violated a criminal statute.
Under these circumstances it will be a hardy bureaucrat indeed
who is willing to blow the whistle on some important but wrong10 Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 631-32 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
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headed policy which is close to the heart of higher-ups in the
Executive branch. Unfortunately, hardihood is not a characteristic for which the bureaucracy has become famous.
In addition to making it a good bit harder for legislators to
get information in the first place, the majority has increased a
Congressman's difficulty in disseminating information once it
is obtained. Most of the time, of course, a Congressman can
disseminate information by inserting a speech or exhibit in the
CongressionalRecord or in a committee record which is printed
and distributed. But even so, a wider public awareness of the
material will be achieved if publication can also be arranged with
journalists and publishers. Also, there are situations, evidenced
in the Gravel case itself, where publication and distribution in
the Congressional Record or in a committee record will not be
feasible: it will doubtlessly be blocked by those men, like Senator
William Saxbe, whose statements on Gravel's conduct indicate
that their view of morality is that revealing the evil deeds
recorded in government archives is a greater sin than committing
the evil deeds. When publication in Congressional journals is
not feasible, arrangements for private reporting and publication
by journalists or book publishers is the only way that a legislator
can obtain wide dissemination of information.
But just as sources will be less willing to give information
if they can be investigated by the grand jury, so publishers will
be much less willing to publish information received by a
Congressman if they can be investigated by the grand jury,
harassed, and subjected to prosecution. And such investigation,
harassment and prosecution is abetted by the Gravel Court's
ruling that the Senator and his aides can be questioned about
republication.
The majority's decision in this case creates yet another bad
situation. As the Court itself has pointed out, a prime historical
reason which underlies the speech or debate clause is the fear
that the Executive, aided by the courts, might intimidate or
silence critical or disfavored legislators by vindictively bringing
criminal proceedings against them. Yet, by opening the door
to grand jury investigations and criminal prosecutions for actions
taken by a Congressman in the line of duty, the Court's opinion
permits exactly the kind of intimidation which the speech and
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debate clause was supposed to prevent. The Nixon Administration would dearly like to silence a man like Senator Gravel. He
is critical of it and disfavored by it. The administration probably
likes him even less than it liked Charles Goodell.
In view of the undesirable results of the rulings on sources
and republication, one may inquire as to what process of logic
led the Court to its conclusions. Basically the Court seemed to
hold that the speech and debate clause is not intended to protect
a legislator from the operation of ordinary criminal laws. Rather,
it is intended to protect so-called legislative acts from intimidation by the Executive. Legislative acts are such things as debating, voting, committee sessions and committee reports.
Legislative acts do not include contacting the Executive branch
or administrative agencies, or private republication through a
publisher of statements and exhibits introduced in legislative
chambers. Nor does the protection given to legislative acts mean
that protection will also be given to illegal actions which are
necessary to prepare for a legislative act: thus while securing
the Pentagon Papers was a necessary preparation for the protected legislative act of reading the Papers at the subcommittee
hearing and putting them in the record, an illegal securing of
them would not be protected.
The jackpot question which stems from the Court's logic is
why shouldn't the concept of legislative acts protect the securing
of the Papers and their republication? Aside from some debatable discussion of the status of republication in merrie olde
England, the Court did not address this question directly.1
Nor did it provide a valid indirect answer by saying that the
speech and debate clause does not protect a legislator from the
ordinary operation of criminal laws. For the whole point of the
speech and debate clause, as well as other constitutional rights,
is that acts which fall within its protection cannot constitutionally
be made a crime by statute. Thus, even if one assumes that
securing and republishing the papers violated a criminal statute,
this would not answer the question of whether these actions are
constitutionally protected legislative acts which cannot validly
be made a crime under statute. The fact that a speech on the
L1Id. at 622.
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floor of the Senate is illegal under a statute would not strip the
speech of protection under the speech and debate clause, and,
by parity of reasoning, securing and republishing the Papers
cannot be denied protection just because these acts are illegal
under a statute.
Because of the majority opinion's paucity of reasoning as to
why the protection afforded by the speech and debate clause
should be narrowly confined, one must turn to another speech
and debate case which was decided on the same day as Gravel,
in order to gain further insight into the majority's view of the
clause. In United States v. Brewster,2 the government charged
that ex-senator Daniel Brewster of Maryland had exacted a
bribe in return for his vote on postage rate legislation. Brewster
argued that the speech and debate clause barred a prosecution on
this charge. Six members of the Court-this time it was the Nixon
four plus Stewart and Marshall-rejected Brewster's argument.
As in Gravel, the majority was unwilling to give an expansive
reading to the speech and debate clause. Not everything related
to the legislative process or to the way legislators normally
function is protected by the clause, said the Court. It does not
protect the doing of errands for constituents, or making appointments with government agencies, or sending news letters to
constituents, or giving news releases, or delivering speeches
outside Congress.' If the clause was expansively interpreted
as protecting all conduct relating to the legislative process, then,
since almost everything a legislator does can somehow be related
to the legislative process, legislators would be super-citizens who
would be immune from prosecution for a wide range of crimes
which they could commit with impunity.' 4
Such an expansive reading of the clause would go far beyond
its purpose of protecting legislative independence. Nor is the
reading a practical necessity in order to protect the legislature
from encroachment by the Executive. Unlike English history,
the American experience does not reflect a catalog of abuses by
which the Executive has managed to subordinate the legislature.
Our check and balance system has preserved the power of each
U.S. 501 (1972).
is Id. at 512.
12408

14 Id. at 516.
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branch because the judiciary has intervened when one of the
other branches attempted to abuse its power and, more importantly, because public sentiment has been hostile to attempts
by one branch to dominate or harass another.
While the purpose of the clause is to protect legislative independence and intregrity, bribery leads to a contrary result,
that of gravely undermining the integrity of the legislature. Thus
the Executive must be permitted to investigate and prosecute
for bribery, and the courts must be permitted to punish for it.
It is true, of course, that the Constitution permits each house
itself to punish its members for bribery, "but Congress is illequipped to investigate, try, and punish its Members for a wide
range of behavior that is loosely and incidentally related to the
legislative process." 6 Congress is not a court. Nor has it shown
much inclination to exert itself in this area.
Even if Congress did police and prosecute its members, such
actions might actually impair the independence of individual
Congressmen. There are no specifically articulated standards
under which a member would be judged by his colleagues; the
member would be at the mercy of a body that functions as
prosecutor, judge and jury; the member would not have the
constitutional protections which apply in a criminal case; and
he would be subject to the passions of party and politics.
Finally, although neither a legislative act such as a vote nor
the motive for the act can be inquired into in court, a prosecution
for bribery can be maintained without such an impermissible
inquiry. To prove its case the government need not show how
the legislator voted on the floor or why he voted as he did. All
it need show is that he entered into an agreement to sell his
vote. Whether he carried out the agreement by voting in
accordance with the bribe is irrelevant.
The three dissenters in Brewster denied that a bribery
prosecution could avoid questioning a legislative act like a floor
speech or a vote. 16 They felt that a bribe case inevitably impugns
and calls into question the act and the motive behind the act.
Moreover, permitting bribery prosecutions was said to open the
15 Id.

16 Id. at 529 (dissenting opinion).
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door to Executive pressure upon Congressmen. The Executive
can warn a legislator that it suspects he has been bribed to speak
and vote against it on some matter. The best way for him to
then avoid possible prosecution, or to create evidence in favor
of acquittal on a bribery charge if he is prosecuted, would be
to succumb to the pressure by speaking and voting in favor of
the administration.
The possibilities for Executive pressure tactics are enhanced
because legislators are constantly acting in the interests of constituents who contribute to their campaigns, and contributions
can easily be made to look like bribes. Indeed, given the sometimes thin line between bribes and legitimate contributions by
constituents who are served by a legislator, it is not the Executive
or courts which are best qualified to punish bribery. Rather it
is the legislature, since legislators are most directly in touch
with political mores and practices and are thus better equipped
to separate legitimate activities from illegitimate ones.
Finally, the fact that the Executive can prosecute legislators
for ordinary criminal conduct such as murder, theft or rape
does not mean it should be able to prosecute them for bribery.
Ordinary crimes and bribery are different in regard to the
potential for Executive pressure and to implicating the motive
behind legislative acts. The Executive will not often have
credible evidence that a legislator committed an ordinary crime
like murder or theft. Nor does such a crime usually involve a
legislative act or its motive. And the way he casts a ballot would
not be instrumental evidence which enables a legislator to win
acquittal on a prosecution for ordinary crime. All of this, of
course, is different in the bribery situation.
All things considered, the majority's arguments in Brewster
should probably prevail. For if this nation is to have a democracy that people can believe in, legislative honesty is a dire
necessity. Thus it is desirable to permit the Executive to ferret
out and prosecute bribery. This is particularly true because
Congress itself is so reluctant to punish its own members for
wrongdoing.
But to believe that the majority has taken a properly narrow
view of the protection given by the speech and debate clause
in the context of bribery does not mean that the arguments it
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used can support a narrow view of the clause in the context of
the Gravel case. For the two contexts present some very different
considerations. Bribery strikes at the very heart of the integrity
of the democratic process. It neither aids legislative independence nor does it enhance a legislator's ability to perform his
duties. Rather, it destroys the honesty of his performance. Accepting bribes cries out for punishment if the legitimacy of
government is to be maintained. There is no inherent appeal
in saying that it should receive constitutional protection. And
even if permitting the Executive to prosecute bribery creates
some opportunities for it to put pressure on legislators, this seems
to be a tolerable risk in light of the great stake in stamping out
bribery and the infrequency with which such pressure seems
to have actually occurred.
On the other hand, securing and disseminating information
on the workings of government is vital to the effective functioning of the democratic legislative process. If a legislator cannot
obtain information, or if he cannot disseminate it, then the
ability of Congress and the public to accurately analyze Executive
actions and to stop misdeeds will be hampered. Legislative
speeches will be made in ignorance and legislative votes will be
cast in ignorance, thus undermining the value of the right to
speak and vote and the effective working of the legislative
process. Rather than being a legislature capable of independent
decision making, to a significant extent the Congress will be
reduced to being a rubber stamp for Executive policies about
which it lacks relevant information. The already dominating
power of the Executive branch-which officially hands out only
favorable information-will thereby be enhanced.
There is thus much legitimate appeal in giving Constitutional
protection to a legislator's acts in securing and disseminating
information. Such protection will prevent the kind of prosecutorial pressure which has been brought against Senator Gravel
and which could make legislators hesitant to perform their
duties in accordance with the best dictates of their conscience.
In my view, the appeal of giving protection to the securing
and obtaining of information is not seriously diminished by the
fact that these acts may involve a Congressman in violation of
statutes concerning the obtaining of government property or the
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release of classified information. This country suffers from
elephantine over-classification and secrecy which works to the
detriment of the people. Even if they violate criminal statutes,
actions which puncture the wall of secrecy by revealing governmental misdeeds to the people are eminently desirable, and
it is therefore not difficult to accept the idea or practice of cloaking such revelatory actions with the protection of the Constitution.
Nor is the appeal of giving speech and debate clause protection in the Gravel situation lessened by the Court's scare

argument that an expansive reading of the clause would make
Congressmen into super citizens who could commit a wide
range of crimes with impunity.1 7 Legislators are not in the habit
of commiting ordinary crimes such as murder, burglary, or
criminal fraud. So as a practical matter, there is not much to
worry about in this regard. And if a legislator does commit an
ordinary crime-let's say negligent homicide by running over
someone with a car-he would not receive speech and debate
clause protection just because the securing and republication of
information receive protection. Instead, the question of whether

his act is protected would depend on its relationship to the
values protected by the clause, values such as maintaining the
independence and integrity of the legislature and enabling its
members to do their job with maximum effectiveness. I find it
very dubious that the values protected by the clause would
provide protection for negligent homicide by automobile or for
a host of other crimes one can think of.
Finally, in the context of bribery it is easy to be troubled
by the fact that Congress might be unwilling to penalize its
members or might be an unsuitable forum to do so, and that
bribery might therefore go unpunished unless the Executive can
bring prosecutions. But in the contekt of securing and publishing information, this fact is no bother at all. The Congress and
public need to get more information about the Executive rather
than less, and a lack of Congressional punishment would encourage the flow of information. And if a legislator ever began
revealing information which truly should be kept secret, such
17 Id. at 516.
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as the workings of a hydrogen bomb or the plans for a future
attack by American forces in an existing war, it is difficult to
believe that Congress would encourage or permit this by taking
no action against him.
All in all, then, it is hard to validly support the majority's
refusal to protect the securing and republication of information
in Gravel. And it is thus interesting to note that only one Justice
joined the Nixon four in connection with both securing and
republication. This was Justice White, who is presently one
of the Court's two swing men. White wrote the majority opinion
in Gravel, but he wrote a dissent from the Court's decision in
Brewster. He was therefore the only Justice in the anomalous
if not incredible position of being willing to give an expansive
reading to the speech and debate clause in order to protect
bribery in Brewster, but being wholly unwilling to give the
clause an expansive reading in Gravel in order to protect
actions which helped reveal horrible governmental transgressions
to the country.
In his Brewster dissent, Justice White wrote a footnote
which explained his view of why Senator Gravel could not be
protected but Senator Brewster should be:
In Gravel v. United States ... it is held that the Speech or
Debate Clause does not immunize criminal acts performed
in preparation for or execution of a legislative act. But the
unprotected acts referred to there were criminal in themselves, provable without reference to a legislative act and
without putting the defendant member to the task of defending the integrity of his legislative performance. Here, as
stated, the crime charged necessarily implicates the Member's
8
legislative duties.'
But Justice White's explanation just won't wash. Perhaps the
acts of securing and republishing the Pentagon Papers "were
criminal in themselves." But taking a bribe is also an act which
is criminal in itself. Perhaps the acts of securing and republishing the Papers can be proven "without reference to a legislative
act" such as reading the Papers at the subcommittee hearing or
inserting them in the committee record. But, as the majority
18Id. at 555 (dissenting opinion).
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pointed out in Brewster, the act of agreeing to a bribe can also
be proven "without reference to a legislative ac '19 such as
making a floor speech or casting a vote in accordance with the
bribe. Finally, it is simply wrongheaded to say that a bribe case
necessarily implicates a member's legislative duties and forces
him to justify his legislative performance, but that these things
were not equally true in Gravel. The thrust of Gravel's argument
was that, by obtaining the Papers and making sure that they
got the widest possible dissemination, he was carrying out his
essential legislative duty of providing information to his colleagues and the public. His defense attempted to justify what
he and others thought was a vitally important legislative performance.
We have seen that the Court has not provided good reasons
for refusing to give an expansive reading to the speech and
debate clause in Gravel. We have also seen that, without adequate justification, one of the Court's swing men was willing to
protect bribery but not the securing and republication of important information. Given these facts, what shall we make of
the decision by the Nixon four plus White in Gravel? It appears
that the answer to this question was provided by Justice Douglas
in his Gravel dissent. The speech and debate clause, he said,
is supposed to protect legislators from "prosecution 'by an unfriendly executive and conviction by a hostile judiciary ...
That hostility emanates from every stage of the present proceedings"2 ° (emphasis added).
Indeed, it is not just in the Gravel case that the Justices have
shown hostility to those who were connected with the publication of the Pentagon Papers. Last year, when the original
Pentagon Papers case was decided by the Court, 21 the separate
dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Burger 22 and Justice Blackmun 23 contained a great amount of undisguised hostility toward
the New York Times, and justice White, though he agreed with
the majority in that the Times and the Washington Post could not
19 Id. at 526.
20 Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 636 (1972) (dissenting opinion).

21 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 718 (1971).
22 Id. at 748 (dissenting opinion).
23 Id. at 759 (dissenting opinion).
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be enjoined from publishing their stories, showed a striking
readiness to see criminal punishment visited upon those con24
nected with obtaining and publishing the Papers.
It thus appears that a majority of the Court is going to look
with a most unfriendly eye upon the claims of those who are
defending themselves from prosecutions connected with the
release of the Papers. This is unfortunate. For, in Justice
Douglas' words in Gravel, "The story of the Pentagon Papers is
a chronicle of suppression of vital decisions to protect the reputations and political hides of men who worked an amazing
successful deception on the American people." 5 Those who

blew the whistle on this deception performed an invaluable
public service. They should not be prosecuted. They should be

rewarded and protected. But they had better not look to the
Court for protection.
24
Id.
25

at 713-40 (concurring opinion).
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 647 (1972) (dissenting opinion).

